

# Digital Markets



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## Why do we need new rules?



"Platformisation" of digital markets



Gatekeepers, "winner takes it all markets"



Growing concentration and increasing power imbalances



Limits of ex post competition law enforcement

### **Central ideas of the DMA**

# Fair and contestable digital markets

Gatekeepers, the most powerful actors in the digital ecosystems – Designation based on quantitative and qualitative criteria


Directly applicable ex ante obligations – clear list of do's and don'ts Comprehensive remedies, incl structural measures – Exclusive EU-level enforcement by the Commission

**Complementarity** with competition law and sectoral regulations

# DESIGNATION

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## **Criteria for the designation of gatekeepers – Article 3**




Qualitative criteria\* – Article 3 (1) and (8)

## **Core Platform Services**

Delineation	List
<ul> <li>Exact delineation of the relevant CPS for each gatekeeper depends on the "purpose" of the service (DMA Annex)</li> </ul>	<ol> <li>Online intermediation services (e.g. App Stores, e-commerce)</li> <li>Online search engines</li> <li>Online social networking services</li> <li>Video-sharing platform services</li> <li>Number-independent interpersonal communication services (N-IICS, e.g. messaging apps)</li> <li>Operating systems</li> <li>Web browsers</li> <li>Virtual assistants</li> <li>Cloud computing services</li> </ol>

**10. Advertising services** 

### 6 gatekeepers for 22 services, 4+1 market investigations



Samsung

7

# COMPLIANCE

### **6 MONTHS AFTER DESIGNATION**

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## Map of obligations and prohibitions

#### **Data-related**

- Ban on data combination (5(2))
- Data silos (6(2))
- Data portability (6(9))
- Access to data generated by users (6(10))
- Access search data for online search engines (6(11))

# Fair access

- Fair ranking and ban of self-preferencing (6(5))
- FRAND access conditions (6(12))

# Commercial relations

- Ban MFN clauses (5(3))
- Anti-steering (5(4))
- Reader rule (5(5))
- Ban gag clauses (5(6))
- Termination (6(13))



- Un-installation/choice screens (6(3))
- Side-loading apps (6(4))
- Switching (6(6))

### Reporting

- Report about implementation (11)
- Inform about mergers (14)
- Audit re techniques for profiling consumers (15)

#### Transparency

- Transparency on ads pricing (5(9) and 5(10))
- Transparency on ads performance (6(8))

### nteroperability

- Vertical interoperability for hardware/software (6(7))
- Interoperability for NI-ICS (7)



- Tying with ancillary services (5(7))
- Bundling between CPSs (5(8))

### **Powers of the Commission under the DMA**



#### Governance

- Commission sole enforcer
- Close cooperation and coordination with national competition authorities (Art 38)
- Advisory committee (Art 50) and high-level group (Art 40)

### Investigatory powers

- Requests for information (RFI)
- Market investigations
- On-site inspections
- Interviews
- Interim measures




### **Enforcement powers**

- Non-compliance decisions: fines up to 10% of annual turnover
- Repeated infringements: up to 20% of annual turnover
- Systematic non-compliance can lead to structural measures (company breakup) and a merger moratorium

# **The DMA and Competition Law**

- Ex post and ex ante tools based on Art 101 & 102 TFEU and Merger Reg 139/2004
- Captures any undertaking in any market
- Aims at protecting the competitive process to promote consumer welfare
- No closed list of anticompetitive behaviours and practices
- Necessary to define relevant markets
- Efficiency defence possible



The DMA complements EU and national competition law that continues to apply in parallel (Art 1(6) DMA).

Investigations under Art 101 & 102 TFEU remain relevant for outside DMA.

Member States can use info obtained under Art 14 DMA to trigger review under EU merger control.

- Ex ante regulation based on Art. 114 TFEU
- Applies to gatekeepers and core platform services
- Aims at addressing unfairness and lack of market contestability
- Closed list of prohibitions and obligations
- Art. 14 imposes obligation to inform about mergers but no control ex ante
- No need to define markets
- No efficiency defense



Note: Solution: Solutio

# **Thank You**