This PhD course has been canceled due to the coronavirus. We may reschedule the course for sometime in the fall 2020 or spring 2021.
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NHH and BECCLE have the pleasure of announcing the PhD course «Exclusive contracts and digital platforms» with associate professor Özlem Bedre-Defolie (ESMT Berlin and UoB/BECCLE) and professor Greg Shaffer (University of Rochester and NHH/BECCLE). The course will take place in late April at NHH.
Dates: April 27 – April 30, 2020
Lecture times: Four hours each day, 1015-1200 and 1315-1500.
The course is free of charge, external students can enroll here (minimum 14 days before the course starts):
https://www.nhh.no/en/study-programmes/phd-programme-at-nhh/phd-courses/application-to-follow-phd-courses-at-nhh/
This course aims to provide students with a strong understanding of contracts between vertically related firms (Business to Business contracting). It investigates the strategic use of exclusive contracts in vertical settings, and provides state-of-the-art models of multi-sided platforms in digital markets. In particular, it considers the competitive effects of exclusive contracts in traditional markets, paying particular attention to how upstream firms are able to induce downstream buyers to sign them. In markets with digital platforms, the course investigates digital platforms’ optimal pricing and design decisions, and the effects of a platform’s contractual conditions with its sellers on competition between sellers and between platforms.
The types of contracts considered include exclusive-dealing clauses, market-share requirements, loyalty discounts, long-term contracts, and Most-Favored-Customer clauses (MFCs). Contracts with non-linearities that do not explicitly reference rivals are also considered and the question is asked when such contracts may harm competition. Policy implications will be considered throughout the course.
Specific topics will include:
1) Chicago school critique of naked exclusion
2) Exclusives to enhance investment incentives
3) Exclusives when there are externalities across buyers
4) Entry deterrence by exclusionary clauses
5) What makes multi-sided platforms different from standard firms
6) How to account for these differences in pricing and designing important aspects of digital platforms.