Enforcement of laws prohibiting cartels is a fundamental part of antitrust policy in most countries. This has also been
the case in the Nordic countries for several decades. Although the Nordic countries’ antitrust enforcement is
harmonized with EU competition law, the enforcement systems have until recently varied quite a lot from country to
country in the Nordic region.

In this seminar we will discuss the design of better cartel policies and, in particular, how various elements
complement each other to lead to more effective policies. Beginning with a general discussion of cartel policy design,
we will then explain and discuss the legal enforcement systems in the four largest Nordic countries of Norway,
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, emphasizing similarities, but even more so how they differ. Next, the legal cartels
that existed before 2000 will be contrasted with the illegal cartels that have been detected by competition
authorities during the last two decades. We will also review and discuss recent changes in Swedish cartel policy.
Finally, recent challenges for cartel enforcement will be discussed with a focus on the rise in the role of algorithms.

DETAILED PROGRAM

Speakers presentations:

Joseph Harrington, Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, Design of optimal cartel policy

Ingrid M. H. Barlund, Associate professor of Law, University of Bergen, Cartel enforcement within the Nordic countries – shared experiences and new insights

Frode Steen,Professor of Economics at Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Legal Cartels in Nordic Countries Before 2000

Lars Sørgard, Professor of Economics at Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Illegal cartels in Nordic countries after 2000

Lars Henriksson, Professor of Law, Stockholm School of Economics, Cartel enforcement in Sweden – recent experiences